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Saunders: If I Told You Then I'd Have to Kill You: The Standard for Discove
IF I TOLD You THEN I'D HAVE TO KILL You: THE STANDARD FOR
DISCOVERY OF TRADE SECRETS IN SOUTH CAROLINA

I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1992, South Carolina joined a group of forty-five other states and the
District of Columbia by enacting legislation based on the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act.1 Apparently unsatisfied with this first enactment, in 1997, the South
Carolina legislature enacted the South Carolina Trade Secrets Act2 (Act). The
new Act contains most of the same language of the previous statute but includes

additional provisions under the portion of the Act relating to the preservation of
secrecy during the discovery phase of civil actions.3 This specific language of

1. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act was drafted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as an attempt to create some consistency in trade secret law,
mostly through the codification of general common law principles. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
(amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 531 prefatory note (2005). Only Massachusetts, New Jersey, New
York, and Texas have yet to adopt a version of the uniform act. Id. at 529-30 tbl.; see WYO. STAT.
ANN. §§ 40-24-101 to -110 (2009). For adoptions of the act by other states, see ALA. CODE §§ 8-271 to -6 (LexisNexis 2002); ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.50.910-.945 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 44-401 to -407 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-75-601 to -607 (2001); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 34263426.11 (West 1997 & Supp. 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 7-74-101 to -110 (2009); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50 to -58 (West 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2001-2009 (2005); D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 36-401 to -410 (LexisNexis 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 688.001-.009 (West 2003); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-760 to -767 (2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 482B-1 to -9 (LexisNexis
2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 48-801 to -807 (2003); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1065/1 to 1065/9
(West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-2-3-1 to -8 (LexisNexis 2006); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 550.1-.8
(West 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-3320 to -3330 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 365.880.900 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1431-:1439 (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, §§ 1541-1548 (2009); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW §§ 11-1201 to -1209 (LexisNexis 2005);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.1901-.1910 (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325C.01-.08
(West 2004); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-26-1 to -19 (2009); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 417.450-.467 (West
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 30-14-401 to -409 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 87-501 to -507
(2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 600A.010-.100 (LexisNexis 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 350-B:1 to -B:9 (LexisNexis 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-3A-1 to -7 (LexisNexis 2004); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 66-152 to -157 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 47-25-01 to -07 (1999); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 1333.61-.69 (LexisNexis 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, §§ 85-94 (West 2002);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.461-.475 (2009); 12 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5301-5308 (West 1999 &
Supp. 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 6-41-1 to -11 (2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 37-29-1 to -11
(2004); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-25-1701 to -1709 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-24-1 to -9
(2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4601-4609 (2006); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-336 to -343 (2006 &
Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.108.010-.940 (West 1999); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 4722-1 to -10 (LexisNexis 2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 134.90 (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 4024-101 to -110 (2009).
2.
S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-8-10 to -130 (Supp. 2009). This Act repealed the previous
statutory provisions. See id.
3.
Compare id. (providing the current requirements under the South Carolina Trade Secrets
Act), with S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-8-1 to -11 (Supp. 1992) (providing the prior requirements under
the Uniform Trade Secrets Act). The new Act also includes unique provisions concerning protection
for trade secret owners during criminal proceedings and concerning the employer-employee
relationship. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 39-8-30, -100 (Supp. 2009). For an analysis of the distinctions
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the statute, which is unique to South Carolina, requires a party seeking discovery
of a purported trade secret to show a "substantial need" for the information to
compel discovery. 4 The relationship between this statutory test and the inquiry
applied in most jurisdictions, which was formulated from Rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,5 remained unclear until the Supreme Court of
South Carolina answered the question of what is the appropriate standard for
discovery of trade secrets in South Carolina in Laffitte v. Bridgestone Corp.6 The
court held that the proper standard was the "balancing test" associated with Rule
26(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. In adopting the balancing
test, the court held the provisions of the Act to be complementary to the
balancing test.8 Because of this difference in application, the test as applied by
the supreme court affords increased protection to the holder of trade secrets than
that of other jurisdictions.
Part II of this Note offers an overview of trade secret law and discusses the
policies and theories that shape this jurisprudence. Part III evaluates the Laffitte
case and the standard for discovery of trade secrets adopted in the opinion within
the general context of trade secret law. The first subpart of Part IV discusses the
details of the standard and how it compares to the test employed by other
jurisdictions. The second subpart of Part IV examines the possible impacts of
adopting this test, such as the benefits of uniformity and any impact on the
business community.
II. OVERVIEW OF TRADE SECRET LAW
Like other states that have enacted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 9 South
Carolina law defines a trade secret as the following:
information, including, but not limited to, a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, product, system, or
process, design, prototype, procedure, or code that... derives
independent economic value.., from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable.., by the public or any other person
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and.., is the
subject of efforts.., to maintain its secrecy. 1°

in section 39-8-30, see Kirk T. Bradley, Note, Employees Beware: Employer Rights Under the
South CarolinaTrade Secrets Act, 49 S.C. L. REv. 597 (1998).
4.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-60(B) (Supp. 2009).
5.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
6.
381 S.C. 460, 471, 674 S.E.2d 154, 160 (2009).
7.
Id. at 475, 674 S.E.2d at 162-63.
8.
Id. at 475, 674 S.E.2d at 162.
9.
See sources cited supra note 1.
10. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-20(5)(a) (Supp. 2009).
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A trade secret could simply be a fact, or it could be a "series or sequence of
items or procedures."1 1 Trade secrets are not defined by their form or subject
12
matter, but instead they are determined by their secrecy and economic value.
Thus, trade secrets can be almost any information that imparts on its holder some
competitive advantage, including "manufacturing processes, methods of doing
business, formulae and ingredients, devices, computer programs and databases,
and almost any other form of technology or business information." 13 Although
many trade secrets are considered valuable assets to parties that possess them,
this is not always the case, nor is it a requirement. Instead, the confidential
information needs only to protect some competitive advantage for it to contain
sufficient "economic value."15
Although high value may not be a prerequisite for trade secrets, such secrets
are often important assets to businesses and their preservation can be
determinative of a company's success. 16 Thus, providing protection to trade
secrets has long been considered an important part of sustaining a healthy
economy. 17 State laws that are designed to protect trade secrets can serve the
important function of allowing inventors to preserve the economic advantage of
being the first producer of a product, which helps maximize the profit from their
discovery.
Trade secret value can be immense, but that value depends on maintaining
the secrecy of the information.1 9 Once a competitor knows a trade secret, the
owner risks losing its competitive edge if the competitor chooses to exploit this
knowledge.20 Thus, many companies go to great lengths to maintain the

11. Id.§ 39-8-20(5)(b).
12. MICHAEL A. EPSTEIN, EPSTEIN ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 1.02[A] (5th ed. Supp.
2009).
13. Douglas F. Halijan, The Past,Present, and Future of Trade Secrets Law in Tennessee: A
Practitioner'sGuide Following the Enactment of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 32 U. MEM. L.
REv. 1, 3 (2001) (footnotes omitted).
14. See EPSTEIN, supra note 12, § 1.02[A].
15. Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Robert Unikel, Bridging the "Trade Secret" Gap: Protecting "ConfidentialInformation"
Not Rising to the Level of Trade Secrets, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 841, 841 (1998) ("In today's highly
competitive economic environment, even slight advances in technology, minor improvements in
production, and small refinements in business methods can afford companies tremendous
competitive advantages over their market rivals. Indeed, maintaining exclusive possession of
valuable technical and commercial information often can mean the difference between cornering a
particular market and fighting for financial survival.").
17. Bridgestone Ams. Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189, 192 (Ind.2007).
18. Unikel, supra note 16, at 849.
19. Kelly Irene Phair, Note, Enabling American High-Tech Companies to Protect Their
Secrets Abroad: A Comparative Analysis of Irish and American Trade Secret Regulation, 24
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 507, 515 (2001); see also Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d at 192 ("Unlike
other assets, the value of a trade secret hinges on its secrecy. As more people or organizations learn
the secret, the value quickly diminishes.").
20. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d at 192.
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confidentiality of their trade secrets.2 1 Although trade secret holders have the
responsibility of maintaining the secrecy of their own information, by providing
legal protection to trade secrets, the law acknowledges that the interests of
invention will not be well-served if companies spend too much time and money
on insulating their trade secrets and less on research and development of new
ideas.22 Therefore, part of trade secret law attempts to shoulder the burden of
protection to encourage creativity. 23 In addition to the policy of encouraging
invention by ensuring that the inventor reaps some primary benefit from her
creation, trade secret law also seeks to preserve corporate morals
by
24
criminalizing corrupt practices for obtaining competitors' trade secrets.
Although the aforementioned policies of encouraging invention and creation
are widely accepted justifications of trade secret law, those assertions are not
without dissention.25 Given the broader legal framework in which trade secret
law functions, critics argue these policies appear unpersuasive when compared to
the social costs involved and to the other means of protection inventors have to
safeguard their creations, "such as patent, copyright, trademark, contract, and
criminal law." 2 6 The cost of secrecy can be high, not only for the trade secret
holder seeking to preserve confidentiality, but also for other businesses in the
industry that engage in "wasteful investments in reverse engineering and in
continuing the invention race." 27 It is generally
acknowledged that innovation
28
benefits from the free exchange of ideas, and the public potentially suffers
from a "significant
adverse impact on future innovation" caused by protecting
29
trade secrets.
Furthermore, assuming that trade secret law serves a purpose in encouraging
invention, it can conflict with other important policies, like preserving employee

21. Id. Two well-known examples are the recipes for Coca-Cola and Kentucky Fried Chicken
(KFC). Susan V. Metcalfe, Comment, Protecting Trade Secrets: Is the Remedy Worse than the
Wrong?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 503, 505 (2000). Coca-Cola has stored its formula in an Atlanta bank
vault for about 100 years, while KFC keeps its recipe of eleven herbs and spices in a guarded time
capsule at a secret location. Id.
22. See Unikel, supra note 16, at 847-48 ("II[W]ithout legal protection against corporate theft,
those businesses that continued to invest in innovation would be forced to expend a disproportionate
amount of money on 'self-help' measures designed to protect their innovations from piracy.").
23. See id. at 848.
24. See id.at 846.
25. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REv. 241, 246 (1998) ("Those who tout economic efficiency [as a
justification for trade secret law] either ignore the broader legal context within which trade secret
law operates or fail to take into account all the costs of a trade secret system.").
26. Id.at 264.
27. Id. at 269.
28. Unikel, supra note 16, at 849.
29. Bone, supra note 25, at 270. But see Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 38-39 (2007) (arguing that these social costs are minimized
because, absent trade secret law, owners would still keep the information secret, which would
require others to discover it independently, and society may benefit from the improvements gleaned
during attempts at reverse engineering or duplicate innovation).
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mobility and free competition. Providing too much protection to trade secrets
might impair a skilled employee's ability to transition between employers in the
same industry because the employee gained confidential
31 institutional knowledge,
which the first employer fears the employee will share.
Because state law governs trade secrets, jurisdictions differ on how to
identify and protect this confidential information in judicial proceedings.32
Although no absolute privilege exists barring the discovery of trade secrets
during the course of litigation,33 state courts have acknowledged that the
property rights implicated in trade secrets provide the owners with a qualified
privilege. 34 Courts have therefore sought to protect the interests of trade secret
holders by "preventing harmful disclosure of commercially valuable
information., 35 Contrasted against these significant interests are the needs of
36
prospective litigants who require confidential information to prove their claims.
Thus, a discovery process involving trade secrets requires the court to balance
the interests of the parties in a manner not typically required in discovery
proceedings.37 In Laffitte v. Bridgestone Corp., the South Carolina Supreme
38
Court explained how courts in South Carolina should approach this issue.
III.

LAFFITTE

A.

v

BRIDGESTONE CORP.

FactualBackground

In Laffitte, Angela Plyler and her three children were involved in a single
vehicle accident on July 16, 2005, when the tread from the left rear tire of her
1999 Ford Explorer separated from the tire, allegedly causing the vehicle to
overturn and hit a tree. The accident resulted in the deaths of both Ms. Plyler

30. Unikel, supra note 16, at 849.
31. See id.
32. See Peter C. Quittmeyer, Trade Secrets and Confidential Information Under Georgia
Law, 19 GA. L. REV. 623, 633 (1985) (noting that states differ in how they determine if information
is a trade secret); James J. Watson, Annotation, Discovery of Trade Secret in State CourtAction, 75
A.L.R. 4th 1009, 1016 (1990) ("[T]he criteria for discoverability of trade secrets which have been
articulated by the courts are not uniform.").
33. 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2043 (2010).
34. Watson, supra note 32, at 1015.
35. Id.
36. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 293-94 (D.
Del. 1985) ("It is true that the result may be to compel the defendant to disclose [trade secrets], and
that that may damage the defendant... That is, however, an inevitable incident to any inquiry in
such a case; unless the defendant may be made to answer, the plaintiff is deprived of its right to
learn whether the defendant has done it a wrong." (alterations in original) (quoting Grasselli Chem.
Co. v. Nat'l Aniline & Chem. Co., Inc., 282 F. 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1920))); Watson, supra note 32,
at 1015.
37. Watson, supra note 32, at 1015.
38. Laffitte v. Bridgestone Corp., 381 S.C. 460, 472-76, 674 S.E.2d 154, 161-63 (2009).
39. Id.at 464, 674 S.E.2d at 157.
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and her teenage son Justin, and also caused serious injury to Ms. Plyler's two
minor daughters, Alania and Hannah. 40 Russell Laffitte, acting as personal
representative for the deceased and as conservator for Alania and Hannah,
brought four lawsuits against various defendants, including Bridgestone, the
maker of the left rear tire at issue in the case. 41 Laffitte's complaints, which
alleged negligence, breach of warranty, and strict liability, claimed Bridgestone
"used an inadequate tire design and failed to use proper manufacturing
techniques. 42 Specifically, Laffitte alleged that Bridgestone had "failed to use
sufficient antidegradents to protect the integrity of the tire. 4 3
The court consolidated the four cases for discovery. Laffitte's discovery
requests to Bridgestone included a request that the company produce the steel
belt skim stock compound 45 formula that was used on the defective tire and other
information related to that formula, including any changes that had been made or
variations in formula that may be unique to the factory that had manufactured the
tire. 46 Bridgestone objected to disclosure of this material, contending that the
information was a trade secret and that the plaintiff
could adequately prove his
47
claim without such confidential information. The trial court held a hearing on
the plaintiff's request for the skim stock formula, and after hearing testimony by
experts from both sides, it subsequently issued an order compelling discovery of
the formula.4 8 The court found that Laffitte had proven he could not properly
pursue a design defect theory absent the formula for the skim stock that allegedly
caused the accident.49
Bridgestone then petitioned the Supreme Court of South Carolina for
certiorari review of the trial court's ruling, which the court granted on two
issues: "the appropriate standard for the discovery of trade secret information in
a product liability action" and whether the trial court erred "in finding that

40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 464-65, 674 S.E.2d at 157.
Id.at 465, 674 S.E.2d at 157.

44. Id.
45. See id.
Laffitte's final brief described the skim stock compound in the following manner:
The skim compound is the rubber used to make the steel belt package in a tire. The steel
belt skim stock.., refers to a specifically formulated rubber compound calendared onto
the steel cord to form the steel belts in a steel belted passenger or light truck tire. It is
formulated to provide, among other things, adhesion between the rubber and steel cord,
and between the belts and surrounding components. If the skim compound rubber is not
correctly formulated or is incorrectly mixed its ability to provide adhesion between the
steel cord, belts and surrounding components may be compromised.
Respondent's Final Brief, Laffitte, 381 S.C. 460, 674 S.E.2d 154 (No. 26606) (citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted), available at http://www.sccourts.org/caseOfMonth/Sep2O08
/LaffitteRespondentFinalBrief.htm.

46.
47.
48.
49.

Laffitte, 381 S.C. at 465-66, 674 S.E.2d at 157.
Id.at 465, 674 S.E.2d at 157.
Id.at 466, 674 S.E.2d at 157.
Id.at 471, 674 S.E.2d at 160.
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Respondent established the requisite need" to compel Bridgestone's production
of the skim stock formula.50
B. Supreme CourtAnalysis and Ruling on the Case
In approaching its analysis of the questions presented, the court began by
discussing the two tests proffered by the parties. Bridgestone asserted that the
proper standard for determining whether a purported trade secret should be
discoverable was the test found under the South Carolina Trade Secrets Act,
which requires that a party seeking discovery of a purported trade secret
demonstrate a "substantial need., 52 To establish "substantial need" under the
Act, a requesting party must demonstrate the following:
(1) the allegations in the initial pleading setting forth the factual
predicate for or against liability have been plead with particularity; (2)
the information sought is directly relevant to the allegations plead with
particularity in the initial pleading; (3) the information is such that the
proponent of the discovery will be substantially prejudiced if not
permitted access to the information; and (4) a good faith basis exists for
the belief that testimony based on or evidence deriving from the trade
secret information will be admissible at trial.53
Laffitte argued that the Act was inapplicable in products liability cases and
that the appropriate test would be under Rule 26(c) of the South Carolina Rules
of Civil Procedure.54 Laffitte contended that the plain language of the statute
limited its applicability to cases involving misappropriation.55 Specifically, the
Act provides that to which it does not apply:
Any and all other civil remedies that are not based upon
misappropriation of a trade secret or upon protection against
misappropriation of a trade secret are governed by the rules of
procedure, rules of evidence, regulations, and the common law
applicable
to the administrative law tribunal or court where the action is
56
filed.

50. Id.
51.

See id. at 472-75, 674 S.E.2d at 161-62.

52. Id. at 473-74, 674 S.E.2d at 161-62.
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-60(B)(1)-(4) (Supp. 2009).
54.

Laffitte, 381 S.C. at 473-74, 674 S.E.2d at 161-62.

55. Id.
56. § 39-8-110(C).
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Laffite argued that because this case was a products liability action and did
not involve any misappropriation claims, the Act should not apply.57
The court rejected this assertion, finding that the Act specifically addressed
discovery matters in broader terms, and cited section 31-8-60(B)," which
requires that "[i]n any civil action where discovery is sought of information
designated by its holder as a trade secret, before ordering discovery a court shall
first determine whether there is a substantial need by the party seeking
discovery. '59 The court held that the plain language of the statute applied the Act
to discovery in "any civil action" where trade secrets were at issue. 6° Although
the court rejected Laffitte's contention that the Act was not intended to apply to
products liability cases, it agreed that the test associated with Rule 26(c)
61
governed
as follows:discovery in this matter. The relevant language of the rule provides
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is
sought,.., the court... may make any order which justice requires to
protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression,
or undue burden by expense, including ...

that a trade secret or other

confidential research, development, or commercial information not be
disclosed or be disclosed only in a designated way. 62
Although not explicit in its reasoning for adopting this test, the court
recognized that this test is typically used by other courts, including in
jurisdictions where trade secrets enjoy a codified evidentiary privilege. 63 As the
language of South Carolina Rule 26(c) mirrors the federal rule, the court adopted
the interpretation of the federal rule, which has been applied as a "balancing test
that incorporates a 'relevant and necessary' standard., 64 As explained by the
court, this examination consists of three parts:
1. The party opposing discovery must show that the information
sought is a trade secret and that disclosure would be harmful. 2. If trade
secret status is established, the burden shifts to the party seeking
discovery to show that the information is relevant and necessary to bring
the matter to trial. 3. If both parties satisfy their burden, the court must

57. Respondent's Final Brief, supra note 45. Laffitte also relied on a South Carolina district
court opinion, Griegov. Ford Motor Co., 19 F. Supp. 2d 531, 533 (D.S.C. 1998), in which the court
interpreted the Act as applying only to misappropriation. See Respondent's Final Brief, supra note

45.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Laffitte, 381 S.C. at 473-74, 674 S.E.2d at 161-62.
§ 39-8-60(B).
Laffitte, 381 S.C. at 473-74, 674 S.E.2d at 161-62.
Id. at 475, 674 S.E.2d at 162-63.

62. S.C. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
63. Laffitte, 381 S.C. at 474-75 & n.ll, 674 S.E.2d at 162 & n.ll.
64. Id. at 474 & n.10, 674 S.E.2d at 162 & n.10.
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weigh the potential harm of disclosure against the need for the
information in reaching a decision.65
The court further explained the test by defining the "relevant" portion of the
inquiry as requiring "that the information must be relevant not only to the
general subject matter of the litigation, but also relevant specifically to the issues
involved in the litigation. 6 6 Additionally, the court held that for the
"information to be deemed 'necessary"' a party "'cannot merely assert
unfairness but must demonstrate with specificity exactly how the lack of the
information will impair the presentation of the case on the merits to the point that
an unjust result is a real, rather than a merely possible, threat."' 67 In constructing
this test, the court did not reject the "substantial need" provisions of the Act but
instead found that as the Act "is consistent with Rule 26 in that both provide for
reasonable restrictions on the discovery of trade secrets," it serves as a
complement to Rule 26.68
The court then applied this standard to the case and concluded that the trial
court erred in ordering discovery of the skim stock formula. 69 The court
addressed testimony of various experts provided by both the plaintiff and the
defendant and held that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff failed to meet his burden
of showing necessity. 70 The majority found that the plaintiff had not sufficiently
shown that the formula was necessary to prove his claim.71 In particular, the
court found that the testimony of Laffitte's experts lacked the "level of
specificity" required to compel discovery because their arguments were not
''sufficiently complete" in explaining the specific reasons why the skim stock
formula was essential to a determination of the tire's failure.72 Additionally, the
court noted the plaintiffs lack of detail in explaining how the case could not be
fairly adjudicated absent the trade secret information.7 3 Despite denying the

65. Id.at 475, 674 S.E.2d at 162.
66. Id.at 475, 674 S.E.2d at 163.
67. Id.at 476, 674 S.E.2d at 163 (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730,
733 (Tex. 2003)).
68. Id.at 475, 674 S.E.2d at 162. In so holding, the court declined to address specifically that
the tests provide different provisions in how to determine discoverability. See id.The court did cite
to Bridgestone Ams. Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189 (Ind.2007). Laffitte, 381 S.C. at
472, 674 S.E.2d at 161. In Mayberry, the Supreme Court of Indiana similarly held that Indiana's
discovery standard under Rule 26 should be "informed by Indiana's enactment of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act"; however, the court concluded that the legislative intent of the enactment was to
provide trade secret law that was uniform with other jurisdictions and determined that the best
manner in which to serve this end would be to adopt the balancing test used by a "substantial
number of courts." 878 N.E.2d at 194. Given that South Carolina replaced the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act with its own Act, the Mayberry court's uniformity rationale would be inapplicable in
South Carolina.
69. Laffitte, 381 S.C. at 480-81, 674 S.E.2d at 165-66.
70. Id.at 476-81, 674 S.E.2d at 163-66.
71. Id.at 480, 674 S.E.2d at 165.
72. Id. at 476-78, 674 S.E.2d at 163-64.
73. Id.at 478, 674 S.E.2d at 164.
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request for the information, the court was careful not to preclude the possibility
of revisiting this issue and indicated that although the testimony put forward was
currently insufficient, the plaintiff could still satisfy his burden at another
point. 4
Justice Pleicones dissented on standard of review grounds, arguing that the
court should sit to review errors of law and not substitute its judgment for that of
the trial judge, which he claimed the majority had done.75 As he did not regard
the lower court's ruling as "'wholly unsupported by the evidence,"' he would
have affirmed.76
IV. THE

STANDARD

FOR

DISCOVERY

OF

TRADE

SECRETS

AND

THE

IMPLICATIONS OF LAFFITTE

Although the court adopted the balancing test derived from Rule 26 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,77 the test expounded by the court is shaped by
the language of the Act 78 and presents some slight, but distinct, differences from
the balancing test applied in other jurisdictions. 79 Notably, the court's
interpretation of what the requesting party must demonstrate to show that the
information requested is relevant differs from the requirements generally used by
other jurisdictions. 80 These differences, however, are not fundamental, but they
do increase the burden on South Carolina litigants requesting discovery of a
trade secret. By construing the "substantial need" inquiry as a complement to the
balancing test it employed, the court retained the added protections for trade
secrets owners that the legislature created while also maintaining the discretion
afforded to courts by the balancing test. Although the additional protections
provided by the statute place increased burdens on the party seeking discovery of
a trade secret, the structure of the balancing test allows the court to consider the
interests of both parties in determining whether to compel production. However,
despite the appearance of equity and judicial discretion provided by the
balancing test, the test as adopted by the supreme court serves the interests of a
trade secret holder by making it more difficult for the party requesting
production to pass the second prong of the test and make it to the discretionary
prong. Because the test as applied by the court has more stringent requirements
that differ from the test as generally applied in other jurisdictions, litigants who
appear in South Carolina courts requesting discovery of trade secrets should

74.
satisfy his
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 481, 674 S.E.2d at 165 ("[I]f at any time during the litigation, [the plaintiff] can
burden of showing necessity, this matter could be revisited.").
See id. at 481-82, 674 S.E.2d at 166 (Pleicones, J., dissenting).
Id. (quoting Berry v. Spigner, 226 S.C. 183, 189, 84 S.E.2d 381, 384 (1954)).
Id. at 474-75 & n.10, 674 S.E.2d at 162-63 & n.10.
See id. at 475, 674 S.E.2d at 162.
See infra text accompanying notes 82-120.
See infra notes 82-110 and accompanying text.
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expect to bear a heavier burden in obtaining confidential information than in
other jurisdictions. 81
A.

The Laffitte Standard
1.

"FactualPredicatefor or Against Liability"

In Laffitte, the court did not clearly indicate how it was using the first prong
of the "substantial need" test in its application of the balancing test, and the
82
parties presented differing interpretations on how to satisfy this inquiry.
Laffitte argued that he need plead only specific facts as to the claims involved
and the general basis for liability.83 Bridgestone argued that as the requesting
party, the plaintiff must "set forth, with particularity, a 'factual predicate'
supporting the claimed need., 84 Bridgestone read the statute to require that the
requesting party plead specifically why the trade secret information was
needed,85 while Laffitte understood the statute to simply require that the basis for
liability had been sufficiently pled.86
Because the court did not directly address this prong, it is unclear whether
the court agreed with Laffitte that he needed to show only that he had stated a
factually based claim of liability or whether the prong was incorporated into
another part of the balancing test. In examining necessity, the court looked to
whether the plaintiff had alleged with sufficient specificity why the disclosure
was essential to the presentation of his case. 87 This first prong may have just
influenced the court's determination of the standard for demonstrating
necessity, 88 which requires that the plaintiff make a "particularized 89
showing"
that he needs the information to receive a fair adjudication of his claim.
Additionally, the court may have recognized that this requirement of
particularized pleading would serve both the plaintiffs and the defendant's
interpretation of this prong in a case involving misappropriation, where a factual
predicate establishing a claim of misappropriation should logically include why
the allegations require the discovery of the trade secret information. 90 Some

81. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
82. See Petitioner's Final Brief, Laffitte, 381 S.C. 460, 674 S.E.2d 154 (No. 05-CP-25-456),
available at
http://www.sccourts.org/caseOfMonth/Sep2008/LaffittePetitionerFinalBrief.htm;
Respondent's Final Brief, supra note 45.
83. Respondent's Final Brief, supra note 45.
84. See Petitioner's Final Brief, supra note 82.
85.

See id.

86. See Respondent's Final Brief, supranote 45.
87. See Laffitte, 381 S.C. at 476, 674 S.E.2d at 163.
88. Id.(citing Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 713 (Ct.
App. 1992); In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Tex. 2003)).
89.

Bridgestone/Firestone,9 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 713.

90. See Microwave Research Corp. v. Sanders Assocs., Inc., 110 F.R.D. 669, 674 (D. Mass.
1986).
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courts have required that plaintiffs demonstrate a factual basis for their claims of
misappropriation prior to obtaining trade secret information from a competitor. 91
By requiring that the claim at least have some specific, factual basis for alleging
liability, courts can better prevent harm from unwarranted disclosure and thwart
litigants who would seek to obtain confidential information merely through
asserting a claim.92
2.

Specific Showing of Relevancy

Although the test as generally defined by the court is similar to other
jurisdictions in its requirement that the requesting party prove that the
information is relevant and necessary, the court asserts a minority opinion on
what relevant means for the purposes of trade secret discovery. In Laffitte, the
court defined relevant as not just relevant to the "general subject matter of the
93
litigation, but also relevant specifically to the issues involved in the litigation."
This increased level of specificity is a departure from most jurisdictions, which
recognize that, generally, "relevancy" should be construed more broadly at
discovery than it would during trial.94 Interestingly, in Bridgestone Americas
Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry95 and Coca-ColaBottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca-

91. See, e.g., Puritan-Bennett Corp. v. Pruitt, 142 F.R.D. 306, 308-09 (S.D. Iowa 1992)
(requiring that a party seeking discovery of a trade secret demonstrate a substantial factual basis for
its claim as a threshold requirement to the court's inquiry into whether such information is relevant
and necessary).
92. See Microwave, 110 F.R.D. at 672 ("[T]hat a litigant . . . alleges that he disclosed
confidential and secret processes to a defendant, which the latter in turn denies, does not
automatically entitle the plaintiff to obtain disclosure of the alleged offending processes in aid of
discovery-otherwise it would be a simple matter to obtain one's trade secret by the mere assertion
of a claim. The end result of disclosure, where ultimately it develops that the asserted claim is
without substance, may be so destructive of the interests of the prevailing party that more is
required than mere allegation to warrant pretrial disclosure." (quoting Ray v. Allied Chem. Corp.,
34 F.R.D. 456, 457 (S.D.N.Y. 1964))).
93. Laffitte, 381 S.C. at 475, 674 S.E.2d at 163.
94. See, e.g., Ex parte Warrior Lighthouse, Inc., 789 So. 2d 858, 860 (Ala. 2001)
('Relevant,' as that word is used in the discovery rules, means relating to the subject matter of the
action and having a reasonable possibility that the information sought will lead to other evidence
that will be admissible ... " (quoting Thomas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. (Ex Parte
Thomas), 628 So. 2d 483, 485 (Ala. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Harrington Mfg.
Co. v. Powell Mfg. Co., 216 S.E.2d 379, 381 (N.C. Ct. App. 1975) (requiring that the information
sought be only 'relevant to the subject matter"' and "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery
of admissible evidence"); George v. Schirra, 814 A.2d 202, 205 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002) ("[T]he
relevancy standard during discovery is necessarily broader than it is for admission at trial. If it were
not, there would be tremendous potential for relevant information and admissible evidence to be
missed by the parties. The informational dragnet during discovery is meant to be wider so that all
relevant and admissible evidence can be discovered pre-trial.").
95. 878 N.E.2d 189 (Ind. 2007). Mayberry involved an accident that was allegedly caused by
a Bridgestone tire. Id. at 190-91. The plaintiff in the case also requested the steel belt skim stock
formula during discovery, to which Bridgestone objected. Id. at 191. After applying the Rule 26(c)
balancing test, the court concluded the plaintiff had not proven a sufficient need for the court to
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Cola Co.,96 two of the leading cases on trade secret discovery, both courts held
that the relevance standard used in applying the balancing test is the same
"general relevance" standard applicable to pretrial discovery. 97 The intention
behind allowing a broad scope of discovery is to ensure that litigants have access
to all the material facts they may need to present their claims.98 Although this
same standard of relevancy applies to any information requested for production,
not just privileged information, the court in Mayberry reasoned that this part of
the balancing test provided "an additional safeguard for the underlying trade
secret" by requiring "relevance to be affirmatively reestablished." 99
The Laffitte court instead followed the reasoning of a South Carolina district
court case, Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,1 which held that parties
must show a higher level of relevancy in cases where the requested information
includes trade secrets. 102 The court concluded that because of the real risk of
allowing an opposing party to discover "doubtfully relevant trade secrets" and to
then exploit them for their own business purposes, a requesting party should
have to prove that the requested information is genuinely relevant to the issues
involved. 10 3 This narrower interpretation of "relevancy" is also more consistent
with the language of the Act. Under the second prong of the substantial need test,
a requesting party must demonstrate that "the information sought is directly
relevant to the allegations . . . in the initial pleading."1 °4 The Laffitte court

compel discovery because the plaintiff did not demonstrate the likelihood of an unjust result absent
the disclosure of this information. Id. at 193-97.
96. 107 F.R.D. 288 (D. Del. 1985). In Coca-Cola, the plaintiffs sued the Coca-Cola
corporation for breach of contract, seeking an injunction to force the company to sell them the syrup
used in Diet Coke. Id. at 289. In the course of discovery, they requested "the complete formula,
including the secret ingredients," of several of Coca-Cola's drinks. Id. at 289-90. The court found
the formulas were both relevant to the subject matter of the litigation and necessary for the plaintiffs
to prepare for trial and therefore should be produced in discovery. Id. at 297-99.
97. Coca-Cola, 107 F.R.D. at 293; Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d at 195.
98. Watson, supra note 32, at 1030.
99. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d at 195.
100. Laffitte v. Bridgestone Corp., 381 S.C. 460, 475-76, 674 S.E.2d 154, 163 (2009).
101. 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
102. Id. at 1185.
103. Id. Although this higher standard of relevance appears to be a minority interpretation,
South Carolina is not alone in requiring a showing greater than the relevancy showing required in
general discovery requests. See, e.g., Am. Standard Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 742 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (requiring that a party requesting production of confidential information demonstrate "some
relationship between the claimed invention and the information sought"); Eutectic Corp. v. CoOrdinated Indus., Inc., 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 751, 751 (W.D. Pa. 1974) ("While there is no absolute
privilege to prevent the discovery of trade secrets, the court is obligated under Rule 26 to protect
parties from unnecessary disclosure of confidential information not immediately relevant to the
controversy."); Int'l Nickel Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 15 F.R.D. 357, 357-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1954)
(holding that in a suit for patent infringement where only the characteristics of the finished cast iron
were at issue, confidential information relating to the manufacturing processes was irrelevant).
104. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-60(B)(2) (Supp. 2009).
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incorporated this provision into the balancing test by heightening the level of
relevancy that a party must show to obtain discovery of a trade secret.10 5
The supreme court's relevancy determination provides holders of trade
secrets with more protection by affording them this extra precaution to ensure
that the trade secret information requested is actually relevant to the issues at
stake. 10 6 The supreme court's test thus uses additional steps to ensure that the
parties do not use the judiciary "to achieve misappropriation or mere
leverage."'10 7 Although avoiding misuse of the judicial process and preventing
needless disclosure of confidential information are important considerations, it is
unclear whether requiring this more specific showing of relevancy is needed to
serve these policies. Other jurisdictions that use a general relevance standard
must also consider preventing abuse of the judicial process, 10 8 and there is no
evidence that their standard insufficiently protects the interests of trade secret
holders. Rather, the relevancy standard adopted in Laffitte may do little to
decrease the unnecessary disclosure of trade secrets but much to increase the
burden on requesting parties. 10 9 During discovery, requesting parties must plead
with specificity as to how the trade secret information is relevant to the issues
involved and not just the subject matter of the litigation to pass the first part of
their burden under South Carolina's balancing test. °
3. ParticularizedShowing of Harm
In addition to choosing a narrower requirement of relevance, the court also
adopted a more rigid interpretation of necessity than that applied elsewhere. 1
The Coca-Cola court defined necessity as "necessary for the movant to prepare
its case for trial, which includes proving its theories and rebutting its opponent's
theories."1 12 However, there is a split in authority, and several jurisdictions have
required more than just the need to prepare for trial as a predicate to allowing
discovery of trade secret information.
The Laffitte court adopted the more

105. See Laffitte, 381 S.C. at 475-76, 674 S.E.2d at 163.
106. See id.
107. Bridgestone Ams. Holding, Inc. v. Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d 189, 193 (id. 2007).
108. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 292-93 (D.
Del. 1985); Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d at 193.
109. Some jurisdictions do not even include the element of relevancy in their balancing tests.
See In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730, 732 (Tex. 2003) (determining
discoverability of trade secrets by analyzing whether "the information was necessary or essential to
the fair adjudication of the case, [and] weighing the requesting party's need for the information
against the potential of harm to the resisting party" (citing In re Cont'l Gen. Tire, Inc., 979 S.W.2d
609, 609-13 (Tex. 1998))).
110. Laffitte, 381 S.C. at 475, 674 S.E.2d at 163.
111. See id. at 476, 674 S.E.2d at 163 (quoting In re Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc., 106 S.W.3d
at 733).
112. Coca-Cola, 107 F.R.D. at 293.
113. See, e.g., Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. Rptr. 2d 709, 713 (Ct.
App. 1992) (stating that to satisfy the necessity requirement, a litigant requesting the information
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stringent view that a showing that the information is "necessary" requires more
than just proof that the trade secret would be useful and should include evidence
that without this information there is a real threat that injustice may occur as a
result of the movant's inability to present properly her case. 4 While this
standard is similar to that used in a few other jurisdictions, 1 5 the court again
chose a more narrow definition when determining necessity.
4. Information Must Lead to Admissible Evidence
In addition to requiring a stringent level of relevancy, when the court
incorporates the other provisions of the "substantial need" test, South Carolina's
balancing test would also require a showing that the information sought will be
admissible or lead to admissible evidence. u 6 As the Laffitte court stopped its
inquiry after determining the plaintiff had failed to prove the necessity of the
requested information," it is unsurprising that it never mentioned whether the
admissibility of the evidence would have been relevant to its determination of
whether to order discovery. Although at first blush, this admissibility test
appears to be an additional burden upon the requesting party, the language of the
Act can be read to demand no more than the general relevancy required for the
discovery of any information.1 1 8 Any information sought must at least be
"reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence."11 9
Furthermore, other jurisdictions have interpreted the balancing test as
specifically not requiring proof of admissibility120 but still demanding that the
information likely lead to some admissible evidence or testimony. 121 Thus, the

must show it "would be unfairly disadvantaged in its proof absent the trade secret"); In re
Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc., 106 S.W.3d at 733 ("[A] party seeking [trade secret] information
cannot merely assert unfairness but must demonstrate with specificity exactly how the lack of the
information will impair the presentation of the case on the merits to the point that an unjust result is
a real, rather than a merely possible, threat."), cited with approvalin Mayberry, 878 N.E.2d at 196.
114. Laffitte, 381 S.C at 476, 674 S.E.2d at 163 (citing In re Bridgestone/Firestone,Inc., 106
S.W.3d at 733).
115. See cases cited supra note 113.
116. See Laffitte, 381 S.C. at 473, 674 S.E.2d at 161 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-8-60(B)(4)
(Supp.2009)).
117. See id. at 476-81, 674 S.E.2d at 163-66.
118. Compare § 39-8-60(B)(4) ("'Substantial need' as used in this section means ... a good
faith basis exists for the belief that testimony based on or evidence deriving from the trade secret
information will be admissible at trial."), with S.C. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) ("It is not ground for
objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought
appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.").
119. S.C. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
120. See WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCuS, supra note 33, § 2043 ("It is important to note that
relevance to the subject matter of the litigation is what must be shown and there is no requirement
that the information sought be admissible at trial.").
121. See Watson, supra note 32, at 1016 ("A number of courts ... have held that discovery of
a trade secret is not precluded by the fact that the evidence sought is not admissible since the rules
provide that it is not a ground for objection to discovery that the evidence sought will be
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fourth prong of the substantial need test requirement that the requesting party
demonstrate a "good faith basis" that the trade secret information will lead to
admissible testimony or evidence does not present a new hurdle, but instead it
codifies a consideration that should already take place in any determination of
discoverability.
B. Lack of Uniformity with Other Jurisdictions
As previously mentioned, part of the original impetus for enacting the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act stemmed from the desire to create interstate
uniformity in the treatment of trade secrets.122 Although the South Carolina
Supreme Court's adoption of the balancing test is consistent with how other
states and the federal courts approach the issue of trade secret discoverability, the
application of the test includes several variations. 123 Because the manner in
which the test is applied varies across jurisdictions, 124 South Carolina will lose
some of the benefits of uniformity, such as predictability to potential litigants
and the ability to use case law from more commercial jurisdictions as persuasive
authority.
Although the court and the legislature acted contrary to the purpose of
adopting a uniform law when applying different standards, they would have had
difficulty adopting a standard that did not in some way differ from other
jurisdictions. 1 5 The main reason for this problem is that the way trade secret law
has developed around the nation has now made it nearly impossible for states to
126
achieve uniformity across jurisdictions. Thus, it appears that this statute serves
more to distinguish South Carolina from other states by increasing the burden on
the party requesting discovery of the trade secret.
Because the general purpose of uniform acts is to create consistency across
jurisdictions in the application of the law, South Carolina's deviations apparently

inadmissible at trial if it appears to be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence.").
122. See UNIT. TRADE SECRETS ACT (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 531 prefatory note (2005)
("Notwithstanding the commercial importance of state trade secret law to interstate business, this
law has not developed satisfactorily. In the first place, its development is uneven. Although there
typically are a substantial number of reported decisions in states that are commercial centers, this is
not the case in less populous and more agricultural jurisdictions.").
123. See supra Part W.A.
124. See David S. Almeling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19
& ENT. L.J. 769, 773-74 (2009) (citing Marina Lao, Federalizing
Trade Secrets Law inan Information Economy,59 OHIO ST. L.J. 1633, 1649-50 (1998)).
125. See id.

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA

126. See id.at 773-74 ("[E]ven among the forty-six states that have enacted [the UTSA],
differences remain because legislatures in those states have modified the UTSA and courts in those
states have adopted different interpretations . . .includ[ing] fundamental differences about what
constitutes a trade secret, what is required to misappropriate it, and what remedies are available."
(citing Lao, supra note 124, at 1649-50)).
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seek to serve some other goal. Whether this test will result in anything more than
an increased burden upon a litigant requesting a trade secret is questionable.
A.

Effect of Laffitte on the Business Atmosphere

As another apparent purpose behind enacting the Trade Secrets Act was to
continue developing the state's probusiness atmosphere, 127 it is worth discussing
the likelihood that such an argument for this legislation carries weight. South
Carolina prides itself on its consistent attempts to create a business friendly
environment, and for these efforts, the state has repeatedly received recognition.
The South Carolina Department of Commerce Web site lists numerous accolades
that South Carolina has earned, including recognition as being one of the top ten
probusiness states, having one of the top business climates, and having one of
the best probusiness regulatory environments. 2 8 The actual benefit received by
the state and its residents due to this probusiness atmosphere is debatable.
Although during the 1990s South Carolina added 200,000 jobs through tax
breaks to companies, it remained last in SAT scores, had four out of ten homes
unconnected to sewers, and maintained a "strained tax base that allow[ed] little
leeway in improvement to the public infrastructure." 129 More recently, although
South Carolina lured Boeing away from Washington through some $450 million
in incentives, not everyone agrees the company was worth such a price or that
130
this type of "race to the bottom" strategy best serves the citizens of the state.
There is no assurance that the jobs created will go to current residents of the state
3
even though state taxpayers will bear the burden of these incentives. 1
Additionally, there is some evidence132that Boeing would have expanded to South
Carolina even absent the incentives.

127. See Mark V. Thigpen, Comment, A New Age ofDiscovery: Your Trade Secrets Are Safe
in South Carolina,49 S.C. L. REv.615, 619 (1998) ("Passage of the 1992 legislation reflected the
pro-business attitude of the state's leaders in the early 1990s.").
128. South Carolina Department of Commerce, National Recognitions, http://www.
sccommerce.com/resources/national-recognitions (last visited May 21, 2010).
129. Ivan C. Dale, Comment, Economic Development Incentives, Accountability Legislation
and a Double Negative Commerce Clause, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 247, 256 (2002) (citing Jay
Hancock, S.C. Pays DearlyforAdded Jobs, BALT. SUN, Oct. 12, 1999, at Al).
130. See Yvonne Wenger & Katy Stech, Lawmakers Offered Lure Worth $450M POST &
COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Oct. 29, 2009, at Al ("South Carolina would be much better off
pursuing a long-term strategy by investing in the workforce through education and improving the
infrastructure, [Professor Calvin] Blackwell said."); see also S.C. POLICY COUNCIL, A BAILOUT
FOR BOEING (2009), available at http://www.scpolicycouncil.com/research-and-publications/budget/801-boeingbailoutO2909 ("As it is, South Carolina has the 4th highest state unemployment
rate in the country and the 46th lowest per capita income. Clearly, the economic incentives game is
not working in our favor.").
131. See S.C. POLICY COUNCIL, supra note 130 ("In the end, many questions remain about the
Boeing incentives package. How much is it going to cost taxpayers? Will South Carolinians actually
benefit from the new jobs or will these positions be filled by transplants or foreign workers?").
132. See id.
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By enacting a modified version of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, South
Carolina adopted an act generally considered probusiness in character for the
protection it provides to the holders of trade secrets. 133 The rationale behind
promulgating probusiness legislation is the obvious desire to lure industry into
the state to create jobs and stimulate the economy.
Although attracting
industries has often taken the form of tax incentives, states have recognized that
tax breaks alone may provide insufficient enticement without additionally
furnishing protection for businesses' assets, such as trade secrets and other
confidential information. 135 Because of the essentiality of trade secrets to many
businesses' success and the increase in corporate espionage, trade secret law
plays an important role in protecting these assets. 136
Although the frequent importance of trade secrets to their holders explains
part of the impetus behind enacting stringent trade secret protections, the
question remains whether rigid antidiscovery legislation is attractive to
businesses if litigation involving trade secrets often includes the competing
interests of two companies. By creating a higher threshold for proving relevancy
and necessity, the balancing test employed in South Carolina courts may make it
difficult for a corporate litigant to bring a claim against a competitor, because the
litigant would be unable to conduct discovery to determine which secret may
have been illegally obtained. 137 At times, the owner of a trade secret may not be

133. See Denise H. McClelland & John L. Forgy, Is Kentucky Law "Pro-Business" in Its
Protection of Trade Secrets, Confidential and ProprietaryInformation? A Practical Guide for
Kentucky Businesses and Their Lawyers, 24 N. KY. L. REv. 229, 233 (1997); Lisa A. Jarr, Student
Work, West Virginia Trade Secrets in the 21st Century: West Virginia's Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
97 W. VA. L. REV. 525, 552 (1995).
134. The veracity of the claim that legislation or tax incentives meaningfully affect a
company's determination of relocation remains under debate. See Dale, supra note 129, at 255
(noting that numerous studies have shown that businesses do not base decisions to relocate on
development incentives); Daniel P. Petrov, Note, PrisonersNo More: State Investment Relocation
Incentives and the Prisoners'Dilemma, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L. L. 71, 79 (2001) (stating that
empirical data tends to demonstrate that incentives 'play little or no role in investment decisions'
and additionally that these state incentives fail in stimulating state economic growth" (citing Robert
G. Lynch, The Effectiveness of State and Local Tax Cuts and Incentives: A Review of the Literature,
11 ST. TAX NOTES 949, 949 (1996))).
135. See McClelland & Forgy, supra note 133, at 229 ("Without adequate safeguards to
prevent the misappropriation or theft of these valuable property rights, the value of the other
incentives may prove small indeed.").
136. See Kurt M. Saunders, The Law and Ethics of Trade Secrets: A Case Study, 42 CAL. W.
L. REv. 209, 211 (2006) (citing a study estimating that the "typical business may derive seventy
percent or more of its value from its intellectual property" and another that estimated that "trade
secret theft resulting from industrial espionage" in 1995 resulted in losses exceeding $1.5 billion
(citing ASIS INT'L, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Loss 3 (2002); Janet S. Greenlee,
'Spies Like Them': How to Protect Your Companyfrom IndustrialSpies, MGMT. ACCT., Dec. 1996,
at 31, 31)).
137. See James R. McKown, Discovery of Trade Secrets, 10 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 35, 41 (1994) ("At some point, the plaintiff must identify the specific trade secrets
that allegedly have been misappropriated. If the plaintiff is uncertain concerning which of its trade
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able to identify accurately the trade secret allegedly misappropriated until after it
has conducted discovery. 138 Although commentary about the importance of trade
secret protection in the law chastises the unscrupulous rival, 139 at the onset 14
of0
litigation, which of the parties is the "innocent" victim remains unclear.
Discovery rules that contain a bias favoring a party with the information that it
"designates as a trade secret" may not serve either the interests of justice or the
business that actually suffered the harm. In this way, a more stringent threshold
for obtaining discovery may not serve the business community as fully as the
legislature had intended. Additionally, as these types of incentives may not even
affect the business climate of the state, making the process of trade secret
discovery more difficult may only disadvantage injured litigants without
providing any real benefit to business.
V. CONCLUSION

The asserted policies behind providing legal protection for trade secrets
include, most importantly, the need to uphold corporate morals by criminalizing
corrupt practices used to obtain competitors' trade secrets14 1 and the need to
encourage invention by ensuring that the inventor reaps some primary benefit
from her creation. 142 In discovery matters, these interests must be weighed
against the needs of prospective litigants who require confidential information to
prove their claim. 43 South Carolina's approach to determining the

secrets have been misappropriated, then the plaintiff may need to conduct discovery of defendants
[sic] material before specifying the allegedly misappropriated trade secrets." (footnotes omitted)).
138. Id. n.33 (quoting ROBERT C. DORR & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE
SECRETS, PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS § 1.24, at 40-41 (1990)).
139. See Unikel, supra note 16, at 841-42 ("The law plays an important role in this ongoing
battle for information by protecting information owners from the improper tactics of their hungry
competitors.").
140. McKown, supranote 137, at 35 ("When [a misappropriation case] is first filed, the court
has no idea whether either party possesses a trade secret, whether a misappropriation has occurred,
or whether either party used improper means to obtain the purported trade secret.").
141. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) ("The maintenance of
standards of commercial ethics and the encouragement of invention are the broadly stated policies
behind trade secret law."); see also McClelland & Forgy, supra note 133, at 233 ("Enforcement of
'commercial ethics' through the Trade Secrets Act prevents one person or business from profiting
from trade developed by another, and thereby obtaining a free competitive advantage."); Phair,
supra note 19, at 512 ("First and foremost among the policy considerations [surrounding trade
secret regulation] is the importance of maintaining a sense of morality and good faith on the part of
modem companies.").
142. See, e.g., Quittmeyer, supra note 32, at 626-27 (discussing how trade secret law allows
inventors to control the dissemination of their technology, often resulting in increased profits that
will further the inventors' drive to create).
143. See Grasselli Chem. Co. v. Nat'l Aniline & Chem. Co., 282 F. 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1920)
("It is true that the result may be to compel the defendant to disclose [trade secrets], . . . and that
may damage the defendant. That is, however, an inevitable incident to any inquiry in such a case;
unless the defendant may be made to answer, the plaintiff is deprived of its right to learn whether
the defendant has done it a wrong.").
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discoverability of a trade secret provides broad protection to the trade secret
owner by requiring a particularized and specific showing of relevancy and
necessity. Although the court's constructions of these elements are not unique,
its interpretations represent the narrower reading of both relevancy and necessity.
As a result, litigants requesting discovery of a trade secret in South Carolina
should expect a higher threshold for obtaining this information. Even though
these added protections may have the intended purposes of preventing judicial
abuse or providing a business friendly atmosphere, there is no evidence that
jurisdictions that interpret the balancing test more broadly are deficient in those
areas. Parties requesting discovery of a trade secret will encounter more
obstacles in bringing their claim than in other jurisdictions, but this hindrance is
unlikely to provide any of the intended additional benefits. In light of
disagreements over the actual social value and efficiency of trade secret law,
increasing trade secret protection may not serve the intended policies. Although
trade secret holders benefit from the supreme court's construction of the
balancing test as it was intended by the legislature, the burden placed upon the
requesting party appears disproportionate to any social benefits actually gained.
Ranee Saunders
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